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A Closer Look at the Intersection of Gender Equality 
and Migration in the Netherlands (1995–2005)
Conny Roggeband and Mieke Verloo
1. Introduction
As a concept, intersectionality is used and discussed increasingly in gender stud-
ies, sociology, and economics (Belkhir 2005). A recent overview of scholarly debates 
on gender mainstreaming identiﬁes the relationship of gender equality with other 
complex inequalities, especially those associated with ethnicity and class, but also 
disability, faith, sexual orientation, and age, as one of the major issues in the analysis 
of gender equality policies at the moment (Walby 2005). A main theoretical divide 
seems to be whether to treat gender as always embedded within other social forms, 
and to see intersectionality as always relevant, or to retain the concept of gender as 
a separate category. Several problems also have been identiﬁed with the re-position-
ing of gender equality projects within “diversity” framings. Apart from competition 
over resources and policy priorities, studies stress the danger of overlooking speciﬁci-
ties connected to gender inequality and the loss of attention for power relations in 
diversity framings (Woodward 2005). The major theoretical challenge concerns the 
understanding of the interconnectedness of various inequalities, what also is called 
the phenomenon of intersectionality. 
The concept of intersectionality was introduced by Crenshaw as an escape to the 
problems of identity politics, to “denote the various ways in which race and gender 
interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women’s employment experiences” 
(Crenshaw 1989: 139). She distinguishes between structural intersectionality and po-
litical intersectionality (Crenshaw 1994). What she calls structural intersectionality 
is when inequalities and their intersections are relevant at the level of experiences of 
people in society. She refers to political intersectionality to point at how inequalities 
and their intersections are relevant at the level of political strategies. Political intersec-
tionality refers to the phenomenon that policies targeting one axis of inequality are 
mostly not neutral towards other inequalities. Crucial questions to analyze political 
intersectionality are: how and where is feminism marginalizing ethnic minorities or 
disabled women? How and where are measures on sexual equality or racism marginal-
izing women? 
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Throughout the 1990s gender equality and multiculturalism were seen as com-
patible policy goals. In the logic of both policies, diversity was proclaimed as an 
important value (Young 1990). Multiculturalism as a policy goal and project, how-
ever, has increasingly come under attack (Joppke 2004 and Kofman 2005). It has 
been contested as essentialist and reifying cultural groups (Fraser 2000). Others have 
pointed to the danger of cultural separatism and segregation. Philosopher Brian Barry 
points out the risks of granting cultural groups special rights and suggests that “[t]he 
spectre that now haunts Europe is one of strident nationalism, ethnic self-assertion 
and the exaltation of what divides people at the expense of what unites them” (2002: 
3). From a feminist perspective it has been argued that there is a tension between 
multiculturalism and gender equality (Okin 1999). According to feminist political 
theorist Susan Moller Okin, the multicultural exhortation to respect all cultures of-
ten conﬂicts with the liberal values of freedom and gender equality, because some 
practices and values of cultural minorities are reinforcing inequality and violating 
the rights of women (1999: 14). According to Okin, granting multicultural rights 
to these minorities will perpetuate patriarchal cultures that subjugate women. Okin’s 
position has triggered many reactions opposing the idea of an intrinsic opposition 
between multiculturalism and feminism (Cohen et al. 1999 and Sachar 2001).
The growing critique voiced by actors with very diﬀerent political positions has 
resulted in a retreat from multiculturalism as a policy goal in many European coun-
tries in the late 1990s (Modood 2003; Joppke 2004; Kofman 2005). September 11 
and subsequent events (Bali, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London) have given an 
impetus to this shift. The attacks on civilians led to a widespread questioning about a 
presumed clash of civilizations, culminating in suspicions about the possibilities and 
willingness of Muslims to be integrated in “western” societies (Modood 2003: 101). 
One reaction in diﬀerent parts of Europe and the United States has been a re-asser-
tion of national identity (Kofman 2005: 455 and Modood 2003: 114) and stricter 
integration demands (Doomernik 2005 and Joppke 2004). 
The Netherlands is frequently mentioned as a clear example of this policy shift 
(Entzinger 2003; Modood 2003; Joppke 2004; Kofman 2005). In recent Dutch in-
tegration measures, it is stipulated that people must integrate and understand the 
norms and values of the Dutch society. One of the central values defended as “Dutch” 
is gender equality. Remarkable in this process is how some political actors, who never 
have been strong advocates of gender equality before, now use the argument of gen-
der equality to re-assert national identity and place more restrictive demands upon 
immigrants and resident minorities. 
As we will argue, migrant women have become an “emblematic” policy prob-
lem (Hajer 1995) in the Netherlands. Unequal gender relations in minority groups 
(particularly among Muslims) are now seen as a core problem, demonstrating the 
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“backward” character of Islam and the gap between “modern” Dutch culture and 
the imported culture of immigrants. This problem is seen principally to be located 
in men and in a negative masculine culture. Contradictions prevail when it comes to 
women. Migrant women are not only represented as victims of this misogynous cul-
ture, but—surprisingly—also as the principal key to solving problems of integration 
and emancipation. This is because the emancipation of migrant women is viewed as a 
crucial step towards the emancipation of the “migrant community” in general.
In this chapter we analyze how and why gender has become the key issue in policy 
frames on the integration of ethnic minorities. We examine how a parallel shift has 
occurred in Dutch gender equality policy to an almost exclusive focus on migrant 
women or women from ethnic minorities. In focusing on this double shift, we ask 
questions such as: what gendered cultural practices are seen as a problem? What is the 
gender model that immigrants need to adapt to, and what is deﬁned and promoted as 
national gender regime? To answer these questions, we reconstruct the policy frames 
on gender and migration over the last decade, and seek what actors have been in-
volved (which coalitions) in shifts in framing, what arguments are used, and what 
possible counterarguments/frames can be traced. 
2. Reconstructing Policy Frames
To explore how the debate on migrant women has evolved and what representa-
tions of migrant women as a “policy problem” have gained dominance over time, we 
reconstruct the framing of this issue within the political arena. We seek to discover 
dominant and/or competing frames in the discourse of political actors that make 
sense of diﬀerent situations and events, contribute blame or causality, and suggest 
lines of action (Rein and Schön 1996). Frame analysis can help identify how discur-
sive strategies—be they intentional or not—modify the process itself by excluding 
certain frames or actors and promoting others. As well as other chapters in this vol-
ume, we use a Critical Frame Analysis approach (Verloo 2005) to reconstruct policy 
frames on migration and gender, focusing especially on elements of voice, diagnosis, 
prognosis, roles, causality, and normativity. The ﬁrst element is about voice or stand-
ing, and asks what actor speaks, on which occasion, to what audience or forum, and 
in what form (interview, policy document, letter, or essay). This element is important 
to identify who is involved in the construction of a new frame and who supports this 
frame (frame-coalition). The second element of diagnosis asks what is represented 
as the problem, why it is seen as a problem, and what is mentioned as causes of the 
problem. It also analyzes the attribution of roles in the diagnosis, such as who is seen 
to have made the problem, who is the problem holder, and who are possible victims 
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and perpetrators. The third element concerns the prognosis that contains what is 
represented as the solution to the problem, what goals are formulated, and how these 
goals should be achieved. It also analyzes the relationship between ends and means. 
The fourth element is the call for action (or non-action), who is given a voice in sug-
gesting the course of actions, who should act, and who is acted upon. Critical Frame 
Analysis is used to code diﬀerent positions on the above-mentioned dimensions for 
each analyzed text, starting from the assumption that diﬀerent frames may be pre-
sented within one policy document. The analytic tool helps to group ideas into policy 
frames that typically diﬀer in what is presented as the central problem or as solution 
to this problem.
We take Snow and Benford’s concept of strategic framing (1992), or frame align-
ment strategies, to analyze the evolution of the frames over time. Although the state 
acts as one actor towards its citizens, it is by no means a monolithic actor. The plural-
ism of the state becomes visible in the policymaking process when diﬀerent, some-
times inconsistent, or even excluding frames, may be articulated within one policy 
document. The state is also a changing actor over time as diﬀerent coalitions may take 
oﬃce to govern the state. Snow and Benford’s concept of frame alignment strategies, 
although originally developed to analyze the dynamics between movements, audi-
ence, and adversaries, can be usefully applied to analyze the dynamic nature of fram-
ing by the state. Frame alignment strategies like frame bridging, frame ampliﬁcation, 
frame extension, and frame transformation may be used by ruling governments either 
to stress a certain continuity in state policies, while looking for policy change, or to 
suggest change, even while doing business as usual. 
A reconstruction of policy frames on gender and migration in the Netherlands 
is complicated by the almost continuous shifts in policy labels and categories. In 
the Netherlands, gender equality policies are called “emancipation” policies (eman-
cipatiebeleid), but in the 1990s this policy was called increasingly “diversity” policy 
(diversiteitsbeleid), so as to stress intersections with ethnicity, class, and sexuality. 
Policies directed at migrants also have been labelled diﬀerently over time. In the 
1980s, these policies were called policies on ethnic minorities (ethnische minderh-
eden); in the 1990s the new label became integration policies (integratiebeleid). Also, 
the label of foreigners’ policy or aliens’ policy is used in relation to regulations on en-
trance and permits. Subsequently, migrant women have been labelled diﬀerently over 
time. In the period under study, the group has been referred to as “allochthonous” 
women (allochtone vrouwen); black, migrant, and refugee women (zwarte, migranten- 
en vluchtelingvrouwen); women from ethnic minorities (vrouwen uit etnische minder-
heden); and non-western migrant women (niet-westerse migranten). These diﬀerent 
labels are meaningful as they each give a speciﬁc representation of the group and its 
characteristics. 
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The term most often used in policy texts and debates is that of “allochthonous” 
women. Allochthonous literally means “diﬀerent in relation to” and is used to dis-
tinguish migrants from the “autochthonous” population. The label “allochthonous” 
in the Dutch context means “of foreign descent” and implicitly refers to mainly 
Moroccan and Turkish migrants and their oﬀspring. According to the oﬃcial deﬁ-
nition, someone is allochthonous when one of her parents is born outside of the 
Netherlands. In the public debate, however, second- and third-generation migrants, 
although often naturalized Dutch citizens, are still labelled “allochthonous.” In this 
chapter we alternately use the policy label “allochthonous” women and the more 
common, international label of “migrant” women, although we believe that neither 
of these labels is accurate to describe the speciﬁc position nor the rootedness of many 
of these women in Dutch society.
3. Political Context and Data
The data studied are policy documents and transcripts of parliamentary debates 
on the integration of minorities and the emancipation of women between 1995 and 
2005. In this period, four diﬀerent coalitions governed. From 1995 until 1998 the 
ﬁrst “Purple” cabinet took oﬃce consisting of the Social Democrats (PvdA), the 
Conservative Liberal Party (VVD), and the Progressive Liberal Party (D66). This was 
the ﬁrst Dutch cabinet after the Second World War that did not include the Christian 
Democrats (CDA). The Purple coalition continued for a second period from 1998 
to 2002. In 2002, a new right-wing populist party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn [LPF], named 
after its murdered charismatic leader) entered the Dutch electoral arena after a major 
victory in the elections. This party formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats 
and the Liberal Party, headed by Prime Minister Balkenende, which only lasted for 
87 days. In the following elections, the LPF lost votes and a new center-right coali-
tion of CDA, VVD, and D66 took oﬃce in May 2003.
The texts were selected to include all relevant policy shifts addressing migrant 
women. Gender equality policies, as developed in the Netherlands from 1976 on-
wards, have only marginally addressed the issue of migration and ethnicity until 
2003. One important exception to this was the so-called VEM (women and minori-
ties) projects that ran between 1984 and 1992. These projects aimed to improve the 
labor market participation of women from ethnic minorities. In the period under 
study, 1995 to 2005, most gender equality programs did not include separate chap-
ters, paragraphs, or references to ethnicity, migration, or integration. The 1996 policy 
plan “Emancipation in Progress” marginally addresses migrant women. In the 1997 
policy report there is a paragraph on ethnicity and gender. The gender equality policy 
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documents issued in 1998, 1999, and 2000 do not contain a separate chapter or 
paragraph on ethnicity, migration, or integration and were therefore not selected for 
our analysis. The policy programs of 2001, 2002, and 2003, on the other hand, do 
include separate paragraphs on migrant women. The programs discuss the opportu-
nities and obstacles that these women face when participating in labor and politics. 
A special action plan concerning migrant women, requested by the Parliament, was 
presented in 2003. Both this plan and the parliamentary debate on this plan are in-
cluded in our analysis. 
Parallel to this, the older policy programs and yearly reports on ethnic minorities, 
only occasionally addressed women. The minority reports of 1997, 1998, and 1999 
include separate chapters on the emancipation of black, migrant, and refugee wom-
en. The 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 reports do not address women from ethnic 
minorities separately. In March 2003, the Directorate responsible for integration and 
minorities moved from the Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs to the Ministry of Justice. In 
the same year, a special action plan concerning migrant women, in cooperation with 
the Minister for Equality Policies, was developed, and a high proﬁle commission was 
created to stimulate the participation of migrant women (Commission Rosenmöller 
or PaVEM). 
In this chapter we ﬁrst examine what frames have dominated in the policy docu-
ments on migration and emancipation of the diﬀerent governments that governed 
between 1995 and 2005. We also look at alternative frames presented by other actors 
involved in the political debate on these issues. Then we take a closer look at the 
changes over time in the diﬀerent elements of policy frames: diagnosis, prognosis, 
and call for action. Finally, we analyze how the dominant problem representations 
aﬀect migrant women as the central subject of these policies, and present some ideas 
to understand the changes that have been found.
4. The Evolution of Dutch Policy Frames on Gender and Migration
Stressing the Value of Diversity, 1995–1998
Policy frames on integration and emancipation presented by the two Purple coali-
tions echo a rhetoric of multiculturalism. In the proposed policies cultural diversity 
is presented as a source of richness for society: “In the conviction that optimal use 
of the existent social diversity will enhance the quality of society, social diversity as a 
source of quality is taken as taken as the point of departure for emancipation policy” 
(TK 25601, No. 2: 95). 
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This accent on diversity as a quality is introduced as a new orientation of eman-
cipation policy: “the emphasis has shifted from the backward position of (groups of ) 
women to the recognition of the value of diversity for society as a whole” (TK 26815, 
Nos. 1 and 2: 95). Multiculturalism is also formulated as a goal in migration policy. 
The “integration policy plan 1999–2002” states:
There is nothing wrong with expressing the hope and expectation that our so-
ciety is becoming a multicultural society. […] The government does not have 
the right to deprive minorities from expressing their cultures. In integration 
policy it should be recognized that our society has become multicultural and 
that this bears its consequence, also and more fundamentally for our demo-
cratic state (TK 1998–1999, 26333, No. 2: 7).
The emphasis on diversity and multiculturalism appears to be ambivalent. While 
the authorities want to recognize the value of cultural diﬀerence, they see the “diverse” 
population groups mainly in terms of a range of social problems (poverty, unemploy-
ment, and low education). Migrant women are presented as not being as emanci-
pated and “advanced” as “Dutch” women and therefore should change in order to 
be more similar to the “autochthonous” population. In contrast to the multicultural 
rhetoric, “diﬀerent backgrounds,” “diﬀerent perspectives” and “diverse cultures” are 
mentioned by the government not as sources of advantage or wealth, but rather as 
sources of disadvantage.
During this period there is little political contestation between the diﬀerent politi-
cal parties over the dominant multicultural frame. Typically, the Minister responsible 
for Minority Policies, Dijkstal (VVD), notes that “we all agree that minorities should 
be given the perspective of full participation in society and that pluriformity, mutual 
respect, and maintenance of cultural identity, solidarity, tolerance and integration 
should be the core concepts of our policy” (HTK 1995–1996, 24401, No. 15: 7). 
The parliamentary committee for minority policy focuses strongly on labor market 
participation, education, and delinquency as policy issues and pays little attention 
to migrant women as a speciﬁc target group. Left-wing parliamentarians within the 
gender equality committee instead emphasize the diﬃcult access of migrant women 
to the labor market.
Overall, migrant women are not yet an important policy subject in this period; 
various measures are proposed to stimulate their participation in labor and deci-
sion-making, but no structural policies are developed to improve their position. The 
dominant government frame is a participation frame, with the (left) opposition stress-
ing problems of access.
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Diversity Becomes Problematic, 1998–2002
At the end of the 1990s, two other frames emerge in the policy documents pre-
sented by the Purple II cabinet. These can be characterized respectively as a restric-
tion frame that focuses on how a wave of new immigrants through marriages can be 
prevented, and a vulnerability frame that seeks to legally protect migrant women who 
have dependent residence permits but seek to leave their violent partner. These fram-
ings emerge when discussing a proposal for a new law on the integration of migrants. 
This law, which came into force on the September 30, 1998, obliges immigrants to 
undergo an assessment when applying for a residence permit. This assessment deter-
mines which program the migrant should follow to get a permit. The settling program 
consists of three parts: Dutch language, orientation on Dutch society (including gen-
der relations), and orientation on the labor market. In the parliamentary debates on 
this bill, it becomes clear that immigration issue causes considerable tension within 
the Purple coalition. This is particularly visible when the legal position of women is 
discussed. While the Left (PvdA) emphasizes the vulnerability of women who legally 
depend on their partner and advocates for a less restrictive law that gives women an 
independent permit after three years of marriage, in case of the decease of the partner, 
or in case of violence, the Right (VVD) wants to discourage the entrance of new mi-
grant women as marriage partners. They fear that a more permissive law will result in 
more abuse of the law. This position is shared by the Christian Democrats (CDA), in 
opposition and who even argue that the period of dependence should be prolonged 
from three to ﬁve years, as it was in the old law (TK 89, June 21, 2000).
A contrasting frame, in which the emphasis is on the emancipation of migrants, 
appears to be present in the constitution of Commission AVEM in 2001 (AVEM be-
ing another commission operating before PaVEM). The focus of this committee is to 
study the issue of labor market participation of women from ethnic minority groups 
and to develop policy initiatives to stimulate their participation. In line with this par-
ticipation frame, there is a growing criticism of mainly left-wing MPs within the gen-
der equality committee (and partly also within the committee on integration policy) 
of the lack of structural policies to improve the position of migrant women, resonating 
with the earlier access frame. PvdA MP Bussemaker urges the state secretary to develop 
speciﬁc policies to stimulate the participation of migrant women (HTK 27 061, No. 
7); she fears this group will be ignored by both gender equality and integration policy. 
The state secretary responds to this petition by sending an inventory of cabinet policy 
for allochthonous women to Parliament in March 2003 (SZW03–194), which ac-
cording to her demonstrates that suﬃcient measures are taken.1
1. Available online: http://docs.szw.nl/pdf/34/2003/34_2003_3_3547.pdf.
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Another remarkable shift is how the Liberal party VVD starts to draw the atten-
tion to cultural obstacles of integration, more speciﬁcally obstacles in Islamic culture: 
“Traditional roles predominate within allochthonous families. In certain Islamic cul-
tures boys are placed on a pedestal. In these cases we need an extra change of culture” 
(VVD MP Weekers, HTK 1999–2000, 26 814, No. 5: 4).
In the late 1990s there is a growing political divide between left- and right-wing 
parties in relation to the issues of immigration and integration, with the center party 
CDA siding with the Right. During this period migrant women become politicized, 
both as vulnerable subjects in migration law, and as a group that needs more spe-
ciﬁc measures to increase its participation in society. The emphasis is no longer on 
the added value of migrant women to increase social diversity, but instead migrant 
women become a social problem, framed as having a problematic culture by the Right 
and Center parties, and as having an access problem by the Left.
A Neoliberal Approach to Migration, 2002–2005
The coalitions Balkenende I and II mark an important change in the Dutch po-
litical landscape. During the parliamentary elections of 2002, populist politician 
Pim Fortuyn and his party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) won much support with their 
critique of Dutch integration policies (Doomernik 2005: 35). The LPF joined the 
Balkenende I government (with liberal and Christian-democratic coalition partners), 
focusing on the explicit policy goal of changing existing immigration and integration 
policies. This government soon ended with new elections and the LPF did not join 
the Balkenende II cabinet that was built on the basis of a liberal/Christian-democrat 
coalition. The new government continued the former coalition’s eﬀort to reform in-
tegration policies. 
The Balkenende I and II governments emphasize the individual responsibility of 
migrants to emancipate and criticizes earlier integration policies that deﬁne multicul-
turalism as a central value. 
For a long time integration policies have put too much emphasis on the accep-
tation of diﬀerences between minorities and the autochthonous population. 
Nothing is wrong with that, but often this was understood as if the presence of 
foreign ethnic groups represented an inherent value, an enrichment tout court 
[emphasis in original text]. This means that one loses sight that not everything 
that is diﬀerent therefore is valuable (TK 29203, No. 1).
According to the Balkenende II cabinet, former minority policies have failed to 
integrate minorities into the Dutch society. This conclusion is drawn before the spe-
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cial Parliamentary Research Commission2 that was appointed to evaluate minority 
policies had published its ﬁndings. It is remarkable how the blame for this failure is 
attributed to former governments—neglecting the participation of two of the coali-
tion partners (VVD and D66) in these governments. The proposed solution is not to 
reorganize the principal agent, the state, but to withdraw the state as an active player 
in integration policy. 
Integration policies run the risk of treating minorities as a category that needs 
care. The accent then is too much on providing facilities, provision and ar-
rangements. The cabinet is determined to change this course. […] The cabinet 
wants to stress that citizens, civil organisations and institutions themselves 
should be held responsible for their integration (TK 29203, No. 1).
The citizens referred to as primarily responsible for solving the problems of inte-
gration are migrant citizens. The government seeks to stimulate integration no longer 
through speciﬁc policies or stimulating measures, but through demands and obliga-
tions on migrants.
In this period a joint plan of the Minister of Social Aﬀairs and Employment and 
the Minister of Foreigners’ Aﬀairs and Integration is launched to address the eman-
cipation of women and girls from ethnic minorities. This plan links emancipation 
to integration and puts increasing emphasis on socio-cultural obstacles for integra-
tion and participation. The cultural heritage and religion (Islam) of migrants are 
mentioned increasingly as an essential part of the problem. The imported culture of 
migrants is associated with unequal gender relations, and with violence as a means to 
reinforce this inequality, notably with honor killings, domestic violence, and forced 
marriages (Minister Verdonk, HTK 2004–2005, 29203, No. 1: 9). 
Accentuated by a similar move in integration policy, where migrant women are 
seen as the key to the integration of minorities, migrant women become the central 
subject of gender equality policy. As a result, minority policies become gendered, 
whereas emancipation policies become “ethnicized.” 
The dominant framing that focuses strongly on issues of culture and religion is 
backed by the right-wing parties VVD and LPF, and to a lesser extent CDA. VVD 
Parliamentarian Hirsi Ali states that: “the largest obstacle that women from ethnic 
minorities ﬁnd on their way to emancipation and integration is so-called culturally 
2. This Commission was charged with answering a question that had been raised in a parliamentary 
debate in 2002 by the Socialist Party (SP), namely, why immigrant integration in the Netherlands had 
failed. Its main conclusion was that minority policies have not failed completely and that younger genera-
tions are far more integrated into Dutch society than ﬁrst generation migrants.
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legitimated violence” (TK 58, March 16, 2004: 58–3840). Minister Verdonk acts as 
an important coalition partner in Hirsi Ali’s struggle to put the issue of “culturally 
legitimized violence” on the political agenda. Interestingly, Hirsi Ali’s framing, which 
largely coincides with the dominant government framing, is increasingly contested 
by other female “allochthonous” parliamentarians of more leftist parties. MPs Azough 
(Groen Links) and Koser-Kaya (D66) criticize the almost exclusive focus on culture 
and urge the government to change its focus again to socio-economic participation 
of migrant women and discrimination as a central obstacle for participation (TK 71, 
April 12, 2005). 
From 2003 onwards, migrant women are on top of the political agenda. 
Interestingly, it has been mainly left-wing parties that have urged for more attention 
to the position of allochthonous women and speciﬁc policies directed at them, but it 
is right-wing parties that have determined the direction of these policies. Rather than 
the leftist emphasis on labor market participation, cultural change is now the key is-
sue. As we argue below, rather than a radical shift in framings the changes could be la-
belled as frame-extension. Migrant women already were deﬁned as a policy problem, 
with an emphasis on their socio-economic position, but this problem is ampliﬁed by 
adding a cultural dimension. This ampliﬁcation of the diagnosis is accompanied by a 
new neoliberal master frame that, as we will see, has important implications for the 
proposed solution or prognosis. 
5. A Closer Look at the Changing Debate
Ampliﬁcation of Diagnosis
The central problem as deﬁned between 1995 and 2005 is changing from mainly 
a social structural problem—that focuses on the “backward” position of migrant 
women in education, labour market participation, social security and child care—to-
wards a more and more strictly cultural problem—where Muslim culture is deﬁned 
as an obstacle for the emancipation of migrants, and hence, as a problem in Dutch 
society. Discrimination hardly is mentioned as a problem, nor are Dutch society and 
culture presented as problematic for migrants. In 1998, the Purple II coalition states 
that “in general, Dutch society has well incorporated new populations from diﬀerent 
cultural circles. Social tensions have not occurred” (TK 26333, No. 2: 12). In 2003, 
the Balkenende II cabinet is far more pessimistic about this incorporation: “there 
is a social and cultural gap between minorities and the autochthonous population 
that is diﬃcult to bridge” (TK 29203, No. 1: 6). However, it is mainly the migrant 
population that is held responsible for bridging the gap. Autochthonous Dutch are 
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only marginally seen as a target group, in that they should get more acquainted with 
minorities and learn more about their culture in order to reduce prejudices that may 
hinder integration of migrants. The Balkenende II cabinet aims to stimulate cross-
cultural dialogue. However, only the minority population is expected to reduce cul-
tural diﬀerences and assimilate to Dutch standards and values. 
In policy documents issued between 1995 and 2005 migrant women become a 
“growing problem.” Until 1999, the central problem is deﬁned as the lagging behind 
of migrant women in labor market participation, which results in limited access to 
decision-making, economic and social resources, and dependence on the social se-
curity system. In a later phase, principally from 2003 onwards, new problems are 
added. Minister Verdonk mentions traditionalism and the lack of social participation 
which makes migrant women invisible in society, as barriers to emancipation (Speech 
on September 1, 2003). The policy plan for the integration and emancipation of mi-
grant women and girls highlights (domestic) violence, forced marriages, honor kill-
ings, traﬃcking, and isolation as problems aﬀecting the position of migrant women. 
In sum, rather than a shift in the deﬁnition of the problem, there is an extension 
of the problem: a cultural dimension has been added to a preexisting socio-economic 
problem deﬁnition. As the problem of migrant women is ampliﬁed, the deﬁnition of 
the origin of the problem shifts from individual causes such as knowledge/education 
and language skills and socio-economic causes like mechanisms in the labor market, 
to cultural causes—mainly a traditional culture that privileges men and subordinates 
women and legitimates violence. By increasingly deﬁning religious and cultural prac-
tices, but also intimate relationships and sexuality of ethnic minorities as problem-
atic, the government suggests that it is not primarily structural conditions of Dutch 
society that hinders the participation of migrants, but rather the organization of the 
sphere of intimacy within the migrant community. This suggests a reversal of the 
causal logic in the problem deﬁnition. Whereas until 2003 social and economic in-
tegration is deﬁned as the precondition for cultural integration, a new causal mecha-
nism is proposed in which cultural integration is a necessary precondition for full 
social and economic integration. 
As the problem of “migrant women” grows, the problem of the emancipation 
of “Dutch” women dissolves. Whereas in early emancipation policies, Dutch men 
were the implicit norm for the emancipation and participation of Dutch women, 
migrant women have become the new group of reference. In earlier emancipation 
frames “Dutch” women were lagging behind men (in labor market participation and 
decision-making); the new frame instead stresses the advanced position of “Dutch” 
women compared to “migrant” women. This change in focus even makes the govern-
ment (Balkenende II) conclude that emancipation of “Dutch” women has been ac-
complished. The “liberated” Dutch woman becomes the norm and role model for the 
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“traditional” migrant woman. Simultaneously, non-participation or low participation 
of autochthonous women is neglected or not seen as a problem as their dependence 
is on their partner and not on the state. 
The emancipation of “Dutch” men (attention for a stronger role of men in fam-
ily care responsibilities) also, implicitly, seems to have disappeared from the policy 
agenda. Instead, migrant men surface as a new target group, although absolutely no 
concrete measures are formulated to stimulate their emancipation at all. Migrant 
women are seen as the primary responsible persons for the emancipation of allo-
chthonous men (and children): “If you educate a woman, you educate a family” 
(PaVEM Commission 2003). 
Shrinking Prognosis
While the diagnosis is extended, the prognosis or proposed solution shrinks. In the 
multicultural frame, and in the restriction and victimization frames, the state ﬁgures 
as the principal change agent during the period 1995–2002, but in the individual 
responsibility frame, promoted by the Balkenende II government, migrants are held 
primarily responsible for their own integration. In line with neo-liberal thinking, 
the government no longer opts for welfare state measures and anti-discrimination 
policies to promote integration. Instead, stricter demands are placed on immigrants 
to learn the language, accept a common political culture, and respect values labelled 
“Dutch,” such as tolerance, gender equality, and freedom of expression. 
In the policy frame of the right-wing Balkenende II coalition the special em-
phasis is on (Muslim) women who are put forward both as principal policy targets 
and principal agents of change. This change of perspective is voiced most clearly 
by the Minister for Integration, Verdonk, who argues that “migrant women must 
reproduce the steps taken by autochthonous women to emancipate.” This representa-
tion of Dutch autochthonous women having emancipated themselves, neglects the 
extensive state support for this group since the 1970s. Implicitly, the achievement 
of autochthonous women is attributed to individual eﬀorts rather than to any active 
intervention of the state. This allows allocating a duty to allochthonous women to 
also emancipate themselves without any duty on the state to support them. The state 
thereby withdraws its responsibility to solve the problem. 
The range of goals also shifts. Whereas in earlier policy documents goals mainly 
were formulated in the realms of labor market participation, decision-making, and 
education, in the 2003 “Action Plan on women and girls from ethnic minorities” 
only two of the seven goals address labor market participation and education. The 
other aims focus on cultural obstacles such as forced marriages, genital mutilation, 
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honor killings, sexual relationships, and the emancipation of migrant men, instead of 
socio-structural barriers for participation, and do not involve substantial resources.  
In the evolution of framings there is a convergence of individualization and “cul-
turalization” of the central problem, resulting in inconsistent policy. The individual 
is responsible for the problem, but culture also is responsible. In this tension, it re-
mains unclear how the individual should or could change a dominant culture. The 
means are increasingly symbolic measures like consciousness raising and stimulat-
ing dialogue. There is an inconsistency between the goals formulated, on the one 
hand, and how the problems are constructed, on the other hand. For example, while 
the government aims to ﬁght negative stereotypes, it simultaneously reproduces and 
actively constructs stereotypes like that of the subordinate migrant woman. While 
stimulating dialogue between migrant and “Dutch” women, the government actively 
(re)produces dichotomies between women. Another example of such inconsistency 
is the emphasis on the individual responsibility of migrants for their emancipation, 
while at the same time prescribing the norms of emancipation.
Migrant Women: The Creation of a Homogenous Category
At the end of the 1990s, the deﬁnition of migrant women in emancipation policy 
texts not only includes Turkish and Moroccan women, but also Surinamese, Antillean, 
and refugee women, and diﬀerences in cultural background, age, socio-economic po-
sitions, and in available resources are acknowledged (see, for instance, “Emancipation 
in progress” [HTK 24406, No. 5]). Implicitly, however, the policy almost exclusively 
focuses on women of Turkish and Moroccan descent. In later frames these women 
are equated with Muslim women. Moroccan and Turkish women, and later Muslim 
women, are labelled as having the most “backward” position compared to “Dutch” 
or autochthonous women, who represent the reference group. Other migrant women 
from Surinamese or Antillean descent are seen increasingly as “more advanced” in 
their participation. In this sense the category of migrant women is shrinking. The cat-
egory of “Dutch” women apparently can not include “allochthonous” women, even 
if they are born in the Netherlands or have Dutch nationality, installing a dichotomy 
where none of the two opposing groups are clearly deﬁned, but where the Dutchness 
of women from Turkish and Moroccan descent is denied.
Special attention is paid to new migrants who marry someone from Turkish or 
Moroccan descent living in the Netherlands. Although both women and men from 
Moroccan and Turkish descent marry partners from Morocco or Turkey, far more at-
tention is paid to new female migrants who enter the Netherlands as a consequence of 
their marriage. Apparently, the problem is gendered. “Imported brides” are perceived 
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as a problem, whereas “imported grooms” receive only scant attention. “Imported 
brides” are labelled as even more “backward” than allochthonous women who have 
lived in the Netherlands for some time already, referring to their low educational 
level, their diﬃcult access to the labor market, their poor language skills, and poor 
knowledge of Dutch cultural norms. Their marginal participation on the labor mar-
ket may result in economic dependence on the Dutch state, which implicitly appears 
to be one of the central problems concerning migration.
Within the category of “Dutch” or autochthonous women few distinctions are 
made; mainly, their labor participation and independence from the welfare system 
are brought forward as norm for the participation of migrant women. Paradoxically, 
in the debate on migration and integration, equal gender relations are represented as 
a key characteristic of Dutch identity and culture, whereas in reality traditional gen-
der arrangements (breadwinner/caretaker roles) still hold strong in the Netherlands. 
Only 40 percent of Dutch women between 15 and 65 are economically independent, 
predominantly as a result of part-time work.
In sum, the category of migrant or “allochthonous” women is gradually reduced 
to Muslim women, mainly Moroccan and Turkish women. Within these categories 
remarkably few distinctions are made. Migrant women are generally presented as 
rather traditional, poorly educated, and passive. Some exceptions to this rule are 
mentioned and put forward as role models, but overall there is very little attention 
to the heterogeneity of the group. Diﬀerences in age, class, education, cultural and 
religious orientations, ambitions, lifestyle, or choices are not made visible. 
6. Explaining the Politicization of Migrant Women
How can we understand that migrant women have become such an emblematic 
policy “problem” (Hajer 1995) in the Netherlands? We suggest that the institutional 
context, more speciﬁcally the prevalent citizenship and migration regime and gender 
regime, may provide an explanation.
At the end of the twentieth century, the Dutch citizenship regime was a civic ter-
ritorial regime where migrants had a fairly easy access to citizenship and a culturally 
pluralist regime where the cultural and religious institutions of migrants were pub-
licly recognized and supported (Koopmans et al. 2005). To an important extent, the 
institutional framework for integration and multicultural rights in the Netherlands 
is based on the heritage of pillarization, the segmentation of Dutch society along 
confessional lines originally intended to accommodate conﬂicts between diﬀerent 
native religious groups, and was extended to Muslims. Immigrants were targeted as 
a group and the government facilitated the self-organization of immigrants along 
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ethnic and religious lines, with access to the state in a corporatist system of advisory 
bodies (Koopmans et al. 2005: 71 and Doomernik 2005). 
At the start of the new millennium some important regime changes were made. In 
April 2001, a new Aliens Law restricted the admission of new immigrants and asylum 
seekers (Doomernik 2005). Since 2003, a new law on Dutch citizenship introduced 
stricter criteria of integration. Whereas previously integration was ﬁrst and foremost 
related to employment and education, presently it is more about loyalties and making 
an unequivocal choice for Dutch society by giving up dual nationality (Doomernik 
2005: 35). Measures like a compulsory integration course for immigrants are thought 
to help integration and to ensure loyalty to the central values of Dutch society. The 
focus on cultural integration as a prerequisite for social and economic integration 
has facilitated the attention to gender relations within ethnic groups. Some gendered 
cultural and religious practices of ethic minorities, e.g., arranged marriages, sex-seg-
regated education, and veiling, are seen as conﬂicting with liberal “Western” values. 
Gender relations are at the center of this apparent value conﬂict. Since women are 
often represented as symbols of racial and ethnic boundaries and as guardians of spe-
ciﬁc cultural and ethnic traditions (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989), this may explain 
the policy shift to women as a central problem and as important agents of cultural 
change in minority policies. 
The Dutch gender regime can be characterized as a male breadwinner, female 
caregiver model that has gradually moved to a “1.5 model” in which one partner 
combines care giving with a part-time job. Recent policy measures take the family 
income as a point of departure, while diminishing the individual social security rights 
of those who depend on this family income. Women who lose their breadwinner have 
an economically very weak position. Since migrant women even have a higher rate of 
economic dependence and lower levels of labor market participation, gender equality 
policies have also targeted this group since the 1980s. Since 2003, the implicit frame 
of the government is that autochthonous women have accomplished gender equality, 
but that allochthonous women still do not ﬁt into the Dutch gender model. This 
frame has put migrant women center stage in gender equality policies. In accordance 
with the Dutch “1.5 model,” both their role as earners and caregivers (and educators 
of their families) are central in these new policies.
The shifts that put migrant women at the center of both integration and gender 
equality policies can also be explained in a classic way as the result of a shift from 
a government including the Left to a Center-Right government. The position of 
the Right (VVD) ﬁts strategically both with neoliberal frames of “restricting” state 
intervention and (nationalist) positions opposing immigration. For the Christian 
Democrats their position on gender equality has always been ambivalent, as they are 
the party mostly stressing “family values.” The shift to ethnicizing gender equality 
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policies eliminated the need for them to give attention to gender equality among 
their own constituency. 
However, as our analysis shows, party dominance in government only provides a 
partial explanation, because even when the Left was a coalition partner, the restric-
tion frames were already present, and the alternative access and vulnerability frames 
were weak. Moreover, the Left parties have been inconsistent advocates of gender 
equality since the 1990s, when they abolished their own women’s organization. On 
migration issues, the Left also hosts a wide set of opinions, ranging from a shrinking 
group of adherents of multiculturalism to a growing group in favor of restriction. 
In the dynamics between the parties, the few voices from the Left advocating more 
attention for migrant women were successful in getting this attention, but while 
lacking a strongly articulated party position, were unable to decide on the direction 
of the policies that resulted from this. Rather, the unexpected result was that gender 
equality policies were emptied out in terms of content, target groups, and resources, 
and that migrant women became the emblematic group responsible not only for their 
own emancipation but for the integration of a whole category of migrants. 
7. Conclusions
As our reconstruction of Dutch minority and gender equality policies demon-
strates, there are principally two major shifts in these policies. Minority and integra-
tion policies change from degendered to gendered policies, where unequal gender 
relations become a core focus of attention. Emancipation policies in the same pe-
riod have become “ethnicized,” focusing almost primarily on the emancipation of 
allochthonous women. In these policies, Muslim women are singled out as a group 
in particular need of emancipation. While migrant women long remained invisible 
as the wives and daughters of immigrant workers, Dutch society and politics have 
recently discovered them as the other “other” and placed new demands upon them. 
Policymakers argue that since women are principally responsible for taking care of 
and educating their children, it is mainly women that can and should educate their 
family towards (cultural) change. This gives migrant women a special place in gov-
ernmental policies and suggests that the practices of Muslim women might create an 
important bridge between liberal citizenship and Muslim identity.
The dominant frames of modernization and individual responsibility are reinforc-
ing a dichotomy between the autochthonous “us” and the allochthonous “them.” As 
the problem is more and more deﬁned as a cultural problem, it is implicitly stated 
that there is no problem with the dominant culture and society. The attention has 
shifted from structural to cultural barriers to participate, and these cultural barriers 
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are exclusively located in the migrant (Muslim) culture. This means that Muslim mi-
grants should ﬁrst change their culture before they can fully integrate and participate 
in Dutch society.
Moreover, the dominant framing also reinforces existing power relations. The 
speciﬁc framing in Dutch policies creates and reproduces social dichotomies and 
oppositions between Dutch and “others,” between men and women, and between 
traditional (Muslim) and modern (“western”) cultures. These categories are clearly 
asymmetric in power and status. Also, presenting migrant women as a problem al-
lows the government to take the role of a good-intentioned helper of these women. 
The government, however, limits itself to formulating policy goals and expressing 
demands towards migrant women, without granting them necessary resources or ac-
cess, or removing obstacles for participation. As a result, the state becomes a pater-
nalistic but powerless player that limits itself to a restrictive but no longer proactive 
role. Simultaneously, the negative representations of migrant women as traditional, 
backwards, and (potential) victims may limit the discursive opportunities for identi-
ﬁcation and participation of migrant women, and thus may have the opposite eﬀect 
of what government aims to accomplish.
While the parallel shift in minority and gender equality policies may be unique to 
the Dutch case, the targeting and co-opting of migrant women, in particular Muslim 
women, is now a phenomenon across multicultural Europe. Migrant women are 
portrayed as mainly victims of their culture of origin. In most European countries, 
measures have been taken (or at least advocated) to protect women and girls from 
the harmful practices of “their” culture such as forced marriages, veiling, domestic 
violence, and female genital mutilation.3 There is a strong tendency to understand 
these practices as originating entirely in culture, obscuring other “mainstream” fac-
tors that give raise to and sustain violence against women. This emphasis on culture 
obscures the vulnerable socio-economic position of migrant women, the discrimina-
tion against them, and the socio-political obstacles they encounter. One of these 
obstacles might be the stigmatization of Muslim communities as a result of these 
policies, leading to a further worsening rather than an improvement of the condition 
of migrant women. 
Our analysis is a clear illustration of the phenomenon of political intersection-
ality, in that it shows how relevant ethnicity, religion, and gender are at the level 
of equality policies. Unfortunately, the Dutch policy practices rather illustrate how 
3. This was the issue of the Conference on Gender Equality, Cultural Diversity: European Comparisons 
and Lessons, held in Amsterdam (June 8–9, 2006). The conference papers make clear that in a number 
of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and the UK) measures have been 
taken to protect minority women against so-called harmful cultural practices.
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diﬃcult it is to avoid gender bias in migration and integration policies, and how 
equally diﬃcult it is to avoid an ethnocentric bias in gender equality policies. While 
at ﬁrst sight the gendering of minority and integration policies and the ethnicizing 
of emancipation policies seem to point at attention for intersectionality, our analysis 
shows that Dutch policy framings also reinforce existing power relations, especially 
between the originally Dutch and the migrant population (and their descendants). 
Migrant women are the group that suﬀers most from this bias and from the failure to 
pay attention to political intersectionality.
Note
The authors wish to thank Sawitri Saharso for her valuable comments. 
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